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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Christy Angel Loveland appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon a jury
verdict finding her guilty of possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia,
and driving without privileges. On appeal, Loveland asserts the state did not present sufficient
evidence to support her conviction for possession of methamphetamine. She also asserts the
district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to continue.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Loveland with possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug
paraphernalia, driving without privileges, and failure to provide proof of insurance. (R., pp.4344.) Loveland pled not guilty, and the case was set for jury trial. (R., pp.46-47.)
Loveland arrived late to the jury trial. (Tr., p.6, Ls.1-18. 1) She entered the courtroom
before jury selection while the district court was resolving preliminary matters. (Tr., p.17, Ls.1921; R., p.124.) After the jury was empaneled, Loveland moved for a continuance because she was
feeling ill due to her pregnancy. (Tr., p.105, L. 1 – p.107, L. 19; p.109, L.5 – p.111, L.15.) The
prosecutor opposed Loveland’s request for a continuance. (Tr., p.111, L.16 – p.112, L.21.) The
district court denied the motion due to the significant difficulties of continuing the trial after the
jury had been empaneled and because continuing the trial would prejudice the state. (Tr., p.113,
L.5 – p.114, L.18.) Loveland left the courtroom and did not return for the remainder of the trial.
(Tr., p.114, Ls.13-14; see R., pp.125-31.)

1

All citations to “Tr.” refer to the PDF file titled “Loveland 48121 trs,” which contains both the
jury trial transcript and the sentencing hearing transcript.
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The state presented its case-in-chief. (See
- - Tr., p.129, L.11 – p.184, L.17; State’s Exs. 1A
– 1E, 2A, 2B, 3, 4.) After the state rested, Loveland’s trial counsel moved for a judgment of
acquittal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29. (Tr., p.184, Ls.16-17; p.185, Ls.17-21; R., pp.12930.) The district court granted the motion only as to Count IV, failure to provide proof of
insurance. (Tr., p.186, L.1 – p.189, L.24.) The defense rested without presenting any evidence or
testimony. (Tr., p.194, L.23 – p.195, L.1.) The jury returned guilty verdicts on the remaining
counts. (Tr., p.217, L.7 – p.218, L.8; R., p.162.) On Count I, the district court imposed a unified
sentence of five years, with one year determinate, and retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.232, L.23 –
p.233, L.12; R., pp.184-87.) On Counts II and III, the court imposed credit for time served. (Tr.,
p.232, Ls.17-22; R., pp.184-87.)
Loveland timely appealed. (R., pp.192-94.)
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ISSUES
Loveland states the issues on appeal as:
A. Was there sufficient evidence presented to sustain the controlled substance conviction?
B. Did the court abuse its discretion in not granting a continuance when Ms. Loveland
became too ill to continue due to her pregnancy?
(Appellant’s brief, p.2.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
I.

Did the state present sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could find that
Loveland possessed methamphetamine?

II.

Has Loveland failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied the motion for a continuance?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Loveland Has Failed To Show That The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To
Sustain Her Conviction For Possession Of A Controlled Substance
A.

Introduction
The jury found Loveland guilty of possession of methamphetamine. (R., p.162.) On

appeal, Loveland argues there was insufficient evidence to support the knowledge element of the
charge. (Appellant’s brief, pp.2-8.) She is incorrect. The evidence presented at trial shows that
Officer LeFave discovered methamphetamine wrapped in burnt aluminum foil alongside
paraphernalia used to ingest methamphetamine in Loveland’s back pocket. (Tr., p.137, L.15 –
p.138, L.8; p.157, L.25 – p.158, L.21.) When he asked Loveland what it was, she responded, “Is
it bud?” (Tr., p.139, Ls.2-11.) Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
a rational jury could have found that Loveland knew the substance discovered in her pocket was
methamphetamine or that she believed it was marijuana, a controlled substance. (See R., p.146.)
B.

Standard Of Review
“Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope.” State v. Nuse,

163 Idaho 262, 263, 409 P.3d 842, 843 (Ct. App. 2017). “This Court will uphold a judgment of
conviction entered upon a jury verdict so long as there is substantial evidence upon which a rational
trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution proved all essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.” State v. Tryon, 164 Idaho 254, 257, 429 P.3d 142, 145 (2018) (quotation
marks omitted). “Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon
it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven.” State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho
542, 546, 348 P.3d 157, 161 (2015). “A jury may … draw all justifiable inferences from the
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evidence.” State v. Crabb, 107 Idaho 298, 307, 688 P.2d 1203, 1212 (Ct. App. 1984) (citation
omitted).
“The relevant inquiry is not whether this Court would find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, but whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Eliasen, 158 Idaho at 546, 348 P.3d at 161 (quotation marks omitted,
emphasis original). “In conducting this analysis, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the
jury on issues of witness credibility, weight of the evidence, or reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the evidence.” State v. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 447, 451, 447 P.3d 895, 899 (2019) (quotation
marks and ellipsis omitted).
C.

Substantial Evidence Supports The Jury Verdict
The jury convicted Loveland under Idaho Code § 37-2732(c), which provides, “It is

unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained
directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the
course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter.” § 372732(c) (emphasis added). “The text of the possession statute does not set forth any mental
element of the offense.” State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 925, 866 P.2d 181, 182 (1993). Nevertheless,
the Idaho Supreme Court has held that “the offense requires a general intent, that is, the knowledge
that one is in possession of the substance.” Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183; see also State
v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 632-33, 945 P.2d 1, 3-4 (1996). However, the individual need not
know the substance possessed is illegal. Id. “The requisite knowledge of the presence of a
controlled substance may be proved by direct evidence or may be inferred from the
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circumstances.” State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 65, 122 P.3d 321, 324 (Ct. App. 2005)
(citations omitted).
The evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
with deference to the reasonable inferences drawn by the jury in favor of its verdict, is sufficient
to uphold Loveland’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine. The state presented the
testimony of Officer LeFave. (See Tr., p.129, L.13 – p.161, L.16.) He testified that he stopped
Loveland for driving on a suspended license. (Tr., p.134, L.3 – p.135, L.2.) After verifying that
her driving privileges were suspended, he had Loveland exit her car. (Tr., p.135, Ls.3-20.) Shortly
thereafter, she consented to a search of her person. (Tr., p.135, Ls.15-20.) Officer LeFave
conducted a pat down search of Loveland’s clothing, saw a bulge in her back pocket, and felt a
cut-down straw as well as several pieces of aluminum foil that had been rolled and folded up. (Tr.,
p.137, L.15 – p.138, L.8.) Officer LeFave unzipped her back pocket and took the items out,
discovering .21 grams of a methamphetamine wrapped inside burnt aluminum foil. (Tr., p.157,
L.25 – p.158, L.21; see p.177, Ls.17-19. 2) He asked her what it was. (Tr., p.139, Ls.2-8.) She
“hemmed and hawed” and then responded, “Is it bud?” (Tr., p.139, Ls.5-11.) Officer LeFave
explained that “bud” is slang for marijuana. (Tr., p.141, Ls.8-10.) He also explained that the straw
discovered alongside the methamphetamine is commonly called a “snort straw” because it is used
to ingest methamphetamine, ostensibly by snorting it. (Tr., p.147, L.19 – p.148, L.5.)
The state introduced a portion of Officer LeFave’s bodycam footage depicting the
encounter, which corroborated Officer LeFave’s trial testimony. (State’s Ex. 3; Tr., p.152, L.5 –
p.154, L.24.)

The state also introduced the actual aluminum foil, snort straw, and

2

The evidence at trial showed that the substance found in Loveland’s pocket tested presumptively
positive for methamphetamine, and was later confirmed to be methamphetamine by testing
conducted at the state’s forensic lab. (Tr., p.141, L.24 – p.142, L.12; p.179, Ls.4-9.)
6

methamphetamine discovered in Loveland’s pocket (State’s Exs. 2A – 2B; Tr., p.143, L.5 – p.145,
L.7), as well as photographs of the aluminum foil and methamphetamine (State’s Exs. 1A – 1E;
Tr., p.144, L.18 – p.147, L.5). In sum, the evidence presented to the jury showed that Loveland
was alone in her car when she was stopped; that Officer LeFave discovered methamphetamine
wrapped in burnt aluminum foil alongside an item of paraphernalia that is specifically used to
ingest methamphetamine in the back pocket of Loveland’s shorts; and that her back pocket was
zipped closed until Officer LeFave removed the drugs. Such uncontroverted evidence was
sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Loveland knew she possessed methamphetamine.
Loveland argues no rational jury could find the knowledge element of the charge beyond
a reasonable doubt. (Appellant’s brief, p.7.) According to her, “there is no evidence she was
aware the foil contained methamphetamine.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-7.) She is incorrect. Proper
application of the relevant legal standards shows that the state presented substantial evidence
sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
Loveland also argues there is no evidence showing that she believed she possessed some
other controlled substance. (Appellant’s brief, p.7.) Specifically, she points to the facts that she
consented to the search, she asked the officer what he found in her pocket, she acted surprised or
startled when the officer found the contraband in her pocket, she was not under the influence of
methamphetamine at the time of the stop, and she asked, “Is it bud?” (Id.) She is incorrect for
two reasons.
First, even if the Court concludes – after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution – that no rational trier of fact could have found that Loveland knew she
possessed methamphetamine, the uncontroverted evidence strongly supports the inference that she
believed the substance discovered in her pocket was a controlled substance. The knowledge
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element is satisfied if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Loveland (1) knew the
substance she possessed was methamphetamine, or (2) believed it was a controlled substance. (See
ICJI 403; R., p.146.) The district court correctly explained, according to “the ICJI that sets out the
elements of the offense of possession of a controlled substance … the crime is proved up if the
defendant possessed any amount of the charged substance, in this case, methamphetamine, and
either knew it was the charged substance or believed it was a controlled substance.” (Tr., p.167,
Ls.13-19.) “And so marijuana is a controlled substance, and so if the jury believes, A, that the
defendant was in possession of methamphetamine, and, B, wrongly thought she was in possession
of marijuana instead, under the ICJI, she’s guilty.” (Tr., p.167, Ls.19-24; see Tr., p.168, L.14 –
p.169, L.6.)
Even if the jury concluded that Loveland was mistaken about the fact that the substance in
her possession was methamphetamine, the state’s uncontroverted evidence did, in fact, show that
she nevertheless believed she was in possession of a controlled substance. After Officer LeFave
searched Loveland’s pocket, he asked her what was in it. (Tr., p.139, Ls.2-8.) Loveland
responded, “Is it bud?” (Tr., p.139, Ls.2-11.) This response strongly supports the inference that,
at a minimum, Loveland believed she was in possession of marijuana, a controlled substance
specifically listed in I.C. § 37-2705(d). 3
Second, that Loveland consented to a search, asked the officer what was in her pocket,
acted surprised when the officer found the drugs and paraphernalia, and was not under the
influence of methamphetamine at the time of the stop does not disprove the inference that Loveland
believed she possessed a controlled substance. Such evidence is of limited relevance and at most

3

The jury was instructed that both marijuana and methamphetamine are controlled substances.
(R., p.148.)
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amounts to conflicting evidence. Essentially, Loveland is asking this Court to reweigh the
evidence, which the Court will not do. State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 242, 985 P.2d 117, 122
(1999) (“We will not reweigh the evidence on appeal.”). Accordingly, Loveland has failed to show
that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain her conviction for possession of a
controlled substance.
II.
Loveland Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied
Her Motion To Continue The Trial
A.

Introduction
After the jury was empaneled, Loveland moved for a continuance of the trial because she

felt ill due to her pregnancy. (Tr., p.109, L.5 – p.111, L.9.) The district court denied the motion,
finding that continuing the trial would cause significant difficulties due to the fact that the jury was
already empaneled and because continuing the trial would prejudice the state. (Tr., p.113, L.5 –
p.114, L.18.) On appeal, Loveland asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied the request for a continuance because it did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.10-12.) Loveland’s argument fails. Because the denial of the motion to
continue did not prejudice Loveland’s substantial rights, the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied her request for a continuance.
B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance rests within the sound discretion

of the trial court. State v. Daly, 161 Idaho 925, 927, 393 P.3d 585, 588 (2017). When a trial
court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered
inquiry to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
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(2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Smith, 168 Idaho 463, ___, 483 P.3d 1006, 1019 (2021).
C.

The District Court Properly Denied Loveland’s Motion To Continue
As a general rule, “broad discretion must be granted [to] trial courts on matters of

continuances….” Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983). “Unless an appellant shows that his
substantial rights have been prejudiced by reason of a denial of his motion for continuance,
appellate courts can only conclude that there was no abuse of discretion.” State v. Nunez, 133
Idaho 13, 21, 981 P.2d 738, 746 (1999); -see --also ---------State v. Herrera, 152 Idaho 24, 30, 266 P.3d 499,
505 (Ct. App. 2011) (“The refusal of a defendant’s request for a continuance is reversible error
only if his substantial rights were prejudiced.”); State v. Laws, 94 Idaho 200, 202, 485 P.2d 144,
147 (1971) (“[U]nless an appellant shows that his substantial rights have been prejudiced by reason
of a denial of his motion for continuance, appellate courts can only conclude that there was no
abuse of discretion.”).
Nothing in the record suggests that Loveland’s substantial rights were prejudiced by the
denial of the motion for continuance. Loveland arrived late to the jury trial. (Tr., p.6, Ls.1-18.)
She entered the courtroom before jury selection while the district court was resolving preliminary
matters. (Tr., p.17, Ls.19-21; R., p.124.) After the jury was empaneled, Loveland informed the
court that she was not feeling well due to her pregnancy and expressed three separate times that
she wanted counsel to conduct the trial in her absence. (Tr., p.107, L.6 – p.110, L.7.) The court
asked, “[T]here’s not a request for a trial continuance from the defense. Is that right[?]” (Tr.,
p.110, Ls.8-11.) Following a discussion held off the record between Loveland and her attorney,
Loveland moved for a continuance due to her “poor health today.” (Tr., p.110, Ls.12-16.)
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Loveland explained that she had been experiencing nausea since the night before and that she felt
nauseous when she arrived for trial. (Tr., p.110, Ls.17-24; p.111, Ls.7-9.) She also indicated that
she did not know when her symptoms might subside. (Tr., p.110, L.25 – p.111, L.6.) The
prosecutor opposed the motion. (Tr., p.111, L.16 – p.112, L.21.) Thereafter, defense counsel
informed the court that Loveland had again indicated that if the court did not grant the continuance
she desired her attorney to proceed with the trial in her absence. (Tr., p.112, L.25 – p.113, L.3.)
Ultimately, the court denied the motion. (Tr., p.113, Ls.4-5.) The court articulated specific
reasons for doing so. The court explained that Loveland indicated she had been feeling ill since
the night before the trial and that she felt ill when she initially arrived for trial; yet she had not
communicated that information to the court until after the jury was empaneled. (Tr., p. 113, Ls.414.) The court found that continuing the trial once the jury was empaneled could cause significant
difficulties, unlike a continuance request made before jury selection. (Tr., p.113, Ls.5-14.) The
court also found that granting the continuance would prejudice the state. (Tr., p.114, Ls.2-10.)
In denying the motion, the court informed Loveland that she was free to leave, but that it
was willing make accommodations for her during the course of the trial if she chose to stay. (Tr.,
p.113, Ls.15-23.)

The court also warned her that leaving could potentially have adverse

consequences for the presentation of her defense, including the inability to testify in her own
defense and to confer with counsel regarding evidence. (Tr., p.113, L.24 – p.114, L.11.) Against
the advice of counsel, Loveland chose to leave. (Tr., p.109, Ls.5-15; p.114, Ls.13-14.) At the
parties’ joint request, the court instructed the jury not to draw any inferences about Loveland’s
guilt or innocence from the fact that she had exercised her right not to be present during the
remainder of the trial. (Tr., p.114, L.13 – p.116, L.23.)
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On these facts, Loveland cannot show that her substantial rights were prejudiced. She
indicated four separate times that her own desire was for her attorney to continue with the trial in
her absence. Against the advice of counsel and after being put on notice by the court that she
would not have the opportunity to testify in her own defense if she chose to leave, she nevertheless
chose not to attend the remainder of the trial proceedings. After exercising her right not to be
present for the remainder of trial, the court instructed the jury not to draw any adverse inferences
from her absence. It is presumed the jury followed the district court’s instruction, see State v.
Iverson, 155 Idaho 766, 776, 316 P.3d 682, 692 (Ct. App. 2014), and Loveland has not argued or
shown otherwise.
Loveland argues that the district court “did not reach its decision [to deny the continuance]
by the exercise of reason.” (Appellant’s brief, p.10.) She contends that the district court denied
the motion simply because she did not request the continuance when she first arrived at trial.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.10-11.) According to her, this was not an exercise of reason because (1) she
was not aware that continuing the trial was a possibility when she first arrived; (2) the ruling
assumes her condition was the same when she made the motion as it was when she arrived; and
(3) the request was not an intentional effort to derail the trial. (Appellant’s brief, p.11.) Loveland
is incorrect for two reasons.
First, Loveland’s argument ignores the actual basis of the district court’s ruling. The
district court denied the motion not simply because it could have been made earlier, but because
continuing the trial after the jury was empaneled would prejudice the state and result in “significant
difficulties.” (Tr., p.113, Ls.5-14; p.114, Ls.2-10. 4) The district court exercised reason in

4

Loveland did not waive her double jeopardy right to be tried by the already empaneled jury. State
v. Pugsley, 128 Idaho 168, 173, 911 P.2d 761, 766 (Ct. App. 1995).
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determining that the motion to continue would create significant difficulties due to the fact that the
jury had already been empaneled when the motion was made and that continuing the trial after the
jury was empaneled would prejudice the state.
More importantly, however, Loveland’s argument fails because it ignores the relevant legal
standard. She does not argue, much less show, that her substantial rights were prejudiced by the
denial of her motion for a continuance. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.8-12.) Because Loveland has
failed to show that her substantial rights have been prejudiced by reason of the denial of her motion
for a continuance, this Court can only conclude that there was no abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests the Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 28th day of May, 2021.

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of May, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
DENNIS BENJAMIN
NEVIN, BENJAMIN & McKAY LLP
db@nbmlaw.com

JRP/dd

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General

13

